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Foreign policy under Medvedev: a liberal-technocratic approach  
Russia will elect its next president on 4th March 2012 (or two weeks later, should a second 
round of elections prove necessary). Formally, it is only going to be in May that the 
incumbent head of the state Dmitry Medvedev transfers presidential powers to his successor, 
but in reality his presidency is already over. The end of his tenure was marked by growing 
domestic and international scepticism about his personal leadership, but in this analysis I 
would like to abstain from the emotionally politicised assessments of his four years in office, 
and focus instead on those changes that have occurred in the foreign policy domain since 
2008. 
One of the pivotal criteria for judging the success or failure of Medvedev’s diplomacy is the 
progress made by Russia in its integration into international society. From this crucial 
viewpoint, he certainly widened the 'window of opportunity' for a more positive interaction 
with the West, although the movement in this direction has obviously not been linear. 
Medvedev also took some important steps towards admitting that Russia is more of a 
regional than a global power. He certainly opened up more scope for alternative political 
discourses, and in so doing made Russia more susceptible to international norms of 
democracy, human rights, and civil freedoms.1  
All this made many in the West perceive Medvedev as a liberal alternative to a more 
conservative Putin, though most comparisons between the two leaders were made on the 
differences in their styles of communication and rhetoric.  
[T]he worldviews of Medvedev and Putin have appeared to differentiate, with 
Medvedev in the liberal camp and Putin in the great power balancer camp (the latter 
with nods to Russian nationalists as well).2  
                                                      
1 Stefan Meister, “Eine wachsende Mittelschicht und neue Kommunikationsformen verandern die 
russische Gesellschaft“, The European, 17 December 2011 (http://dgap.org/de/article/20190/print). 
2 Andrew Kuchins and Igor Zevelev, “Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change”, The Washington 
Quarterly, winter 2012, p. 158. 2 | ANDREY MAKARYCHEV 
 
It was the alleged “pro-Atlantic” bias in Medvedev’s foreign and security policy, for which 
he was lambasted by nationalistic voices that, for example, portrayed the Foreign Policy 
Concept adopted in 2008 as being too conciliatory to the West.3 
Yet Medvedev’s alleged liberalism is a very partial and relative conception. His liberalism 
was more an unintended product of a deeply de-politicised vision of governance than a set 
of fundamental values. Putin’s was a foreign policy philosophy that, being grounded in an 
apolitical – and thus managerial, technocratic – type of thinking, nevertheless required 
regular comebacks of political momentum (as exemplified by the famous ‘Munich speech’ – 
widely perceived in the West as a restoration of Cold War confrontational rhetoric). Against 
this backdrop, Medvedev was much less inclined to politicise Russian foreign policy. His 
proposal for a new security architecture in Europe seems to be in contrast to the Munich 
speech of Putin. Of course, as the recent debates in the UN Security Council over Syria have 
demonstrated, he could not avoid politically divisive and even confrontational situations, 
but Russia’s obstruction to Western pressure on the regime in Damascus was a reactive move 
that can be understood in light of Russia’s deep dissatisfaction with the way the situation in 
Libya was handled in 2011.  
It could be argued that “the technological approach to politics is not far from the traditional 
liberal political philosophy”.4 Against this backdrop, the Medvedev presidency has 
demonstrated both the possibilities and limitations of what might be dubbed a liberal 
depoliticisation of Russia’s integration into international society. Yet in (re)assessing 
Medvedev’s foreign policy record in this vein, one has to take into consideration two 
important factors – one domestic, the other external. First, it is obvious that as Russia’s 
President, Medvedev has never enjoyed the freedom to take his own decisions in the sphere 
of foreign policy. The most substantial elements of foreign economic and security policies 
were under the control of Prime Minister Putin and his team in government. There is 
evidence that it was Putin who decided on the launch of military operations against Georgia 
in August 2008, as well as controlling the negotiations with Ukraine on the gas issues. It was 
Putin who stood behind the current ‘thaw’ in Russia’s relations with Poland.5 The Putin-
Medvedev tandem was based on a co-existence of two leaders who had to informally divide 
between themselves the foreign policy domains. As a result of this power-sharing game, 
certain spaces for more or less autonomous manoeuvring were periodically opening for 
Medvedev, in spite of his evident weakness as a political leader.  
Second, it was the policies of Russia’s stronger partners - above all the United States - that 
predetermined some of Medvedev’s policies; characterised as presumably liberal. To a large 
extent, this was due to the “reset” in US-Russian relations announced by both presidents in 
2009. Arguably,  
[T]he Russian perspective on the US changed because of the impact of the global 
economic crisis and changes in the Obama administration’s policies that addressed 
issues of greatest interest to Moscow.6  
As a result, it was US pressure that made Moscow join the international sanctions against 
Iran and break its previous commitment to sell S-300 air defence systems to Tehran. 
                                                      
3 Vladimir Pavlenko, “Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki: ispytanie krizisom, Obozrevatel”, Observer, No. 1, 
2009 (http://www.rau.su/observer/N1_2009/006_024.pdf). 
4 Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière. Creating Equality. Edinburgh University Press, 
2008, p. 149.  
5 Konstantin Gaaze and Mikhail Zygar, “Pust’ opiat’ budet solntse”, Russkiy Newsweek, 9 May 2010. 
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Important progress in de-securitising relations with Georgia – i.e. the conclusion of an 
agreement with the Georgian government that made Russia’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization possible in autumn 2011 – was to a great extent orchestrated and mediated by 
the US. Likewise, it was Germany who “sent a clear signal to Moscow that EU-Russia 
relations are unlikely to progress unless Russia normalises relations with countries such as 
Poland”.7 It was therefore the structural dynamics within international society itself that 
significantly facilitated Medvedev’s allegedly liberal moves. 
Major issues on Medvedev’s international agenda  
Yet what is the main evidence for Medvedev’s depoliticised accents in foreign policy that, by 
and large, have to be seen as important steps towards a more constructive Russian stance in 
the world? Let’s consider a few of the most illustrative cases. 
First, Medvedev instructed the Russian Foreign Ministry to draft a blueprint indicating how 
Russian foreign policy mechanisms could be reshaped to become more pragmatic/profit-
oriented and, thus, less ideological. The resulting document entitled “The Programme for 
Effective and Systemic Use of Foreign Policy Factors for the Sake of Long-Term Development 
of the Russian Federation” was to some extent inspired by the idea of Russia as a “liberal 
empire” evoked, in particular, by Anatoly Chubais several years ago. In this document the 
Foreign Ministry acknowledged the need for dialogue and cooperation with the US in the 
post-Soviet area; the adaptation of successful instruments for modernisation developed by 
Russia’s key international partners; the interest in large-scale investment in the Russian 
economy and the possibility for a long-term lease of land to foreign business in Russia’s Far 
East, etc. The ‘economisation’ of Russia’s foreign policy went as far as claiming that Russia’s 
efforts to get Western economic sanctions against certain countries lifted (namely Armenia, 
Uzbekistan, Iran, Cuba, Syria, Serbia) and assist them in overcoming isolation are expected 
to be materially rewarded by special economic benefits and privileges for Russian 
corporations.8 In fact, this statement is a bold illustration of the deeply depoliticised nature of 
the Kremlin’s foreign policy philosophy – bereft as it is of any meaningful normative or 
value-based foundations.  
Second, it was under Medvedev that Russia acknowledged more distinctly than before the 
utility for Russian interests of NATO’s presence in Central Asia:  
Washington and Moscow closely coordinated their response to the chaos triggered 
by the ouster of President Bakiyev in spring 2010 and to the subsequent ethnic 
clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan,9  
which indeed opens prospects for more constructive Russia-NATO cooperation in the future. 
Third, Medvedev signed the Meseberg declaration, which opens the prospects for Russian - 
German security cooperation, and agreed to consider cooperation over the Transnistria 
conflict as a concrete example. Moscow tried to exert strong pressure upon Igor Smirnov, but 
ultimately failed to dissuade him from running again for the President of this break-away 
territory. Nevertheless, the Meseberg process is one of few instances of Russia’s tacit 
acceptance of the principle of conditionality, which it refutes.  Russian diplomats even 
                                                      
7 Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Nicu Popescu, Dealing with a Post-BRIC Russia, London: European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, p. 50. 
8 “Programma effektivnogo ispol’zovania na systemnoi osnove vneshnepoliticheskikh faktorov v 
tseliakh dolgosrochnogo razvitia Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, Russkii Newsweek, 11 May 2010. 
9 Ben Judah et al., op. cit., p. 45. 4 | ANDREY MAKARYCHEV 
 
expressed interest in participating in some of the Eastern Partnership projects as well 
(instead of earlier irritation and criticism of this EU initiative). 
Fourth, in relations with Poland and Norway, agreements were reached on visa-free border-
crossing for dwellers of adjacent territories, which is an important breakthrough in the so far 
ineffective state of negotiations on visa issues with the EU. Taking into account Russian 
sensitivity on these issues, the agreements concluded with these two neighbouring countries 
are models for progress in the talks with Brussels. Besides, Russian-Norwegian relations 
improved significantly as a result of the Barents Sea agreement concluded by Moscow and 
Oslo in 2010, which delineated the Arctic borders between the two countries and opened the 
way to develop the vast oil and natural gas reserves in the Barents Sea. 
Fifth, Medvedev refused to interfere in the issues of non-citizens’ rights in the Baltic States, 
claiming that this was not Russia's problem. This attitude to some extent contradicts the 
concept of the ‘Russian world’ aimed at supporting Russian-speaking communities living 
abroad. He also refused to intervene in the ethnic conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 
2010, explaining that it was a domestic affair of this country. This inaction seemed to 
contravene the imperial logic that is often ascribed to Russia’s diplomacy toward its 
neighbours.10 
Sixth, in streamlining the Putin-promoted project of the Customs Union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, Medvedev recognised more clearly than anyone else that it went beyond the 
traditional logic of state-to-state liaisons. The Customs Union, in his interpretation, is about 
supranational integration, which presupposes the delegation of certain part of  sovereign 
competences to the new bodies.11 It was also acknowledged that the putative project of 
Eurasian Union is modelled on the EU’s integration model and that in the security sphere its 
founding members have a lot to learn from the NATO experience.12  
The pitfalls of liberal technocracy 
On the other hand, the internationalist agenda pursued by Medvedev was far from 
conclusive. Three cases appear to be the most illustrative in this respect. The first is 
Medvedev’s blueprint for a new security architecture in Euro-Atlantic mega-region, which 
was aimed at proposing a common set of rules for the sake of equal and collective security. 
The very idea of finding an all-encompassing institutional solution for the entire wider 
Europe region is both liberal and, to some extent, apolitical, yet Moscow’s lukewarm attitude 
to the several attempts of formulating common EU–Russian, or NATO–Russian conceptual 
approaches to a new security architecture is deeply political, since it reveals the domination 
of the power component in Kremlin logic. Thus, Moscow ignored at least two chances to 
reinvigorate the security dialogue with the West – it disregarded the “Helsinki Plus” report 
of the EU-Russia Working Group on Human Security chaired by Javier Solana in 2010, and 
distanced itself from the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), chaired by Igor Ivanov, 
Wolfgang Ischinger and Sam Nunn.  
The second case – that of Libya - demonstrates the force of resistance to Medvedev’s policy 
of rapprochement with the West, and its limitations. The war in Libya was one of the 
instances  where Putin's and Medvedev's positions clashed at a certain point. In spite of 
Putin’s parallels between the military operation against Gaddafi and colonial invasions, 
                                                      
10 Fiodor Lukianov, “Imperia naoborot”, Gazeta, 17 November 2011 
(http://www.gazeta.ru/column/lukyanov/3837597.shtml). 
11 Soyuznoe Veche, No. 59 (414), 22-28 December 2011, p. 1. 
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Medvedev at the G8 summit in Deauville not only expressed his understanding of the West’s 
policy towards Libya, but also confirmed the oppressive and therefore illegitimate character 
of Gaddafi’s rule. Medvedev made clear that the Arab revolutions were not provoked from 
the outside, but caused by authoritarianism, corruption and mismanagement. He authorised 
the ban on visiting Russia for Gaddafi and members of his family, and put an end to Russian 
business operations in this country. As early as March 2011, Konstantin Kosachov, Head of 
the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma, supported the prospects of military 
operation against Gaddafi, thus making both normative (solidarity with the Western 
conception of sovereignty as responsibility) and political (support to the coalition forces 
operation in Libya) points. Later, Mikhail Margelov, presidential envoy to Libya, joined the 
chorus of voices eager to see Gaddafi in The Hague tribunal. He also claimed that Russia was 
ready to open its representative mission in Benghazi, based upon earlier acceptance of the 
opposition as a legitimate interlocutor. 
It appears that the Medvedev administration did want to use the crisis in Libya to take 
another bold step along the path of fostering Russia’s pro-European Atlantic agenda. Yet the 
importance of Medvedev’s pro-Western shift should not be overestimated, for at least three 
reasons. Firstly, his sympathies to the anti-Gaddafi coalition were no more than a 
technological move aimed at garnering Western support for Russia’s modernisation agenda. 
Secondly, for Medvedev the symbolism of his engagement with the West was greater than its 
substance: the key to his ‘Libyan’ narrative was the alleged ‘petition’ from Western leaders 
who asked Russia to mediate between Gaddafi and the opposition, and by doing so 
confirmed Russia’s indispensability as a key security actor. Thirdly, Medvedev’s good 
intentions should be viewed not as a well-considered strategy but rather as a by-product of 
the growing imbalances in the Russian policy-making system. Some of his pronouncements 
were implicitly rebuffed by much more critical to the West utterances by Vladimir Putin, 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and vice-Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov. Against this 
background it is quite telling that in the seemingly similar case of Syria, the Kremlin has 
adopted a much more explicit anti-Western standpoint. 
Concluding thoughts 
The presidency of Medvedev, in comparison to that of Putin, can be viewed as a more 
consistent version of the de-politicisation of Russia’s external relations. Medvedev’s alleged 
liberalism – which was ascribed to him by analysts and journalists eager to somehow 
distinguish him from Putin – is grounded in the pre-eminence of legal and economic 
arguments, which constitute the most fertile ground for de-politicising Russia’s international 
behaviour. Arguably, it is this liberal technocratic agenda that was instrumental in the moves 
towards Russia’s deeper integration with the West.  
But the long-term impact of these moves should not be overestimated – suffice it to recall the 
short-lived “reset” of Russian-American relations, followed by a new phase of confrontation 
in the autumn of 2011. Yet Medvedev – despite his far less convincing legacy in Russian 
domestic politics – deserves some praise for having indirectly contributed to the growing 
plurality of Russian foreign policy discourses and alternatives; an asset that needs to be 
preserved and defended in the years to come.  